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The purpose of this paper is to critically review the past four decades of empirical research on 
the relationship between internal migration and regional variation in the generosity of 
Canada’s unemployment insurance system. It has long been argued that because the Canadian 
insurance system is more generous towards people who live in relatively disadvantaged 
regions, it retards the out-migration that is part of the market process, thereby slowing 
economic development and contributing to the persistence of regional inequality in earned 
incomes. The survey shows, however, that there is no evidence in the empirical literature that 
regional variation in the generosity of the insurance system has altered internal migration 
patterns in Canada in a substantial manner. 
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1.   Introduction 
  Over the past four decades, empirical researchers have repeatedly tried to find evidence 
that regionalized aspects of public policy in Canada blunt the tendency for people to move from 
economically  disadvantaged  to  relatively  more  advantaged  places.  The  seminal  academic 
impetus for these endeavours was Thomas Courchene's (1970) study, which suggested that 
public support of various kinds for more disadvantaged regions retards economic development 
and  regional  convergence  by  reducing  the  migration  of  labour  out  of  the  less  prosperous 
provinces. 
  The regionalized nature of the generosity of the unemployment insurance system is one 
of the policies that is often pointed to in this respect, and it is easy to see why.
1   Consider, for 
example, the stylized facts presented in Table 1. Panel A of the table, for 1978-1996, shows how 
the generosity of the Unemployment Insurance (UI) program, as it was then called, varied 
regionally, as measured by minimum weeks required to qualify for insurance payments (MIN) 
and weeks of benefits to which a person with MIN weeks of employment would be entitled 
(MINWKS).
2  MIN tends to vary directly and MINWKS inversely (though not perfectly so in either 
case) with average weekly wages.  
  
                                                            
1  This is so despite the regional economic convergence that has occurred since 1945. On the nature of regional 
convergence in Canada, see for example Coulombe and Tremblay (2001).  





Table 1:  Some Stylized Facts Concerning Earnings 
and Unemployment Insurance in the Canadian Federation 
 
























































































































































Notes: Average weekly earnings data are rounded to the nearest integer.  MIN is minimum weeks required to 
qualify for benefits under Unemployment Insurance, MINWKS is weeks of insurance benefits for a person with MIN 
or MINH weeks of employment, MINH is minimum hours required to qualify for benefits under Employment 
Insurance (converted to its equivalent in weeks assuming a work week of 37 hours in the fourth column of the 
table), CV is the coefficient of variation, and CORR is the correlation coefficient of correlation. 
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  In  1996  some  important  adjustments  were  made  to  the  unemployment  insurance 
system, and its official name was changed to Employment Insurance (EI). As indicated in panel B 
of table 1, since 1996 qualification for insurance benefits depends upon hours of work instead 
of weeks of work, a more stringent requirement for many part-time workers than the previous 
one. However, the table also shows that the pattern of regional variation observed in the post-
1996 system remains similar to that of the earlier period, with qualifying requirements tending 
to be less stringent and weeks of benefits longer in the higher unemployment provinces. And so 
the same concern that regional variation in program generosity induces inefficiencies in the  
allocation of labour across the country applies to the reformed insurance system.  
  The purpose of this paper is to review and critically assess empirical research on the 
relationship between internal migration and the regional variation that has long characterized 
the generosity of Canada’s unemployment insurance system. Such an empirical relationship is a 
prerequisite for any claim that the insurance system is responsible for misallocation of labour 
resources across the country. The extent to which the insurance system 'distorts' the regional 
allocation  of  labour  is  identified  by  the  Mowat  Centre’s  Employment  Insurance  Task  Force 
(Mowat 2010, 5) as a key issue, along with associated questions about interregional equity in 
benefit generosity (p. 7).
3  
  The paper proceeds as follows. In the second section, we discuss from a theoretical 
perspective  why  we  should  expect  regional  variation  in  insurance  generosity  to  alter 
interregional  migration decisions and to reduce national economic wellbeing. In section three 
                                                            
3  The efficiency issue  and the issue of interregional equity in benefit generosity are linked because decisions 
about equity cannot be properly decided without taking into account their possible consequences for the 
allocation of resources. Here the possibility arises that reducing the degree of variation in benefit generosity may 
at the same time enhance efficiency from a national perspective while also enhancing equity in access to the 
system and in benefits received.   5 
 
we introduce additional details concerning the regionalized nature of the insurance system in 
Canada. Section four discusses the way in which empirical researchers have tried to study the 
consequences for migration of the regional variation in program generosity that we document, 
and summarizes the key empirical findings of the Canadian literature. Then, in section five, we 
present our assessment of the “bottom line” of this work. 
  To anticipate our conclusion, we can say that on balance there is no evidence that 
regional  variation  in  the  unemployment  insurance  system  has  altered  internal  migration 
patterns in Canada in a substantial manner. Simulations based on empirical estimates suggest 
that even the complete elimination of the legislated regional variation in the system would not 
be  a  large  enough  shock  to  have  an  important  effect  on  regional  labour  markets.  This 
conclusion  implies  that if  a  change  in  the  degree  of  regional  variation  in  the Employment 
Insurance system is contemplated, justification for such a change is not to be found in the 




2.   Why might regional differences in the generosity of unemployment insurance alter 
internal migration patterns, and why should we care?   
 
  If  individual  migration  decisions  depended  solely  on  earned  incomes  or  labour 
productivities  in  any  region  or  province,  regional  differences  in  the  generosity  of 
unemployment insurance benefits would have no direct effect on migration. People would tend 
to  move  to  places  where  their  earned  incomes  were  greatest,  a  process  that  would  lead 
towards equalization of real wages and labour productivities across regions and provinces. 
Wages will be bid up in places of net in-migration, and down where people are leaving, until 6 
 
real wages and thus marginal labour productivities are more or less the same (adjusted for 
migration  costs).  As  a  result,  'free'  migration,  that  is,  migration  that  is  unaffected  by  any 
government policy, would tend to maximize the contribution of labour services to national  
economic output and, at the same time, to equalize earned incomes across the country.  
  However,  a  more  complete  view  of  the  migration process  must  allow  for  economic 
migration  between  regions  that  depends  on  interregional  differences  in  expected 
comprehensive incomes, where comprehensive income in any place includes, in addition to 
earned income or wages related to productivity, personal taxes paid, transfers received and the 
imputed value of public services provided by any level of government.
4  Guesses about the 
probability  of  employment  in  each  labour  market  will  also  enter  into  the  calculation  of 
expected income. 
  Differences across regions in comprehensive incomes may arise from an unemployment 
insurance system that is more generous in some places than in others, or from differences in 
tax  burdens  or  in  valued  public  services.  Such  differentials  will  lead  people  to  migrate  for 
reasons that are not directly related to real wages or labour productivity alone. Migration will 
then  lead  to  the  equalization  of  expected  comprehensive  incomes  rather  than  of  earned 
incomes, as wages adjust upwards or downwards with in- and out-migration to compensate for 
differences across the country in the relationship between individuals and  the public sector.  As 
a  result,  total  and  average  output  and  income  in  the  country  as  a  whole  will  be  reduced 
because  the  tendency  of  unrestricted  migration  to  equalize  real  wages  and  marginal 
productivities across locations is short-circuited. And since earned incomes are not equalized,  
                                                            
4 Comprehensive income will also include, in principle, the expected discounted value of taxes required to service 
and retire any public debt.  7 
 
interregional disparity in earned incomes must also be increased. 
   In his seminal work on policy-induced migration, Courchene (1970, 1978) pointed to the  
regionalized structure of the unemployment insurance system, which provides greater support  
to people in more depressed places, and to federal grants like Equalization that go only to 
poorer provinces, as policies that create incentives to remain in poorer regions even though  
their earned income would be higher if people moved to a relatively more prosperous province 
like Ontario.
5  For this reason, he referred to relationship between the public sector, migration 
and economic welfare outlined here as the transfer dependency hypothesis.  
   As an empirical statement, this hypothesis may be true. But it is worth pointing out that 
in principle at least, the same sort of reasoning that underlies Courchene's analysis can be used 
to argue that higher rather than lower earned incomes in the poorer provinces will result from 
government policies that favour them. Consider, for example, the case of people from the 
Atlantic provinces who are attracted to Ontario because of the fiscal benefits they can enjoy 
there in the form of better schools accompanied by lower taxes, a situation made possible by 
the larger and richer Ontario population.
6 The resulting migration adds to the Ontario labour 
force and depresses the real wage and the marginal productivity of labour in Ontario. Workers 
will continue to migrate to Ontario even if the real wage is less than in the Atlantic region as 
long as they receive compensatory benefits in the form of better or cheaper public services. 
They  will  continue  to  migrate  until  the  resulting  decline  in  the  real  wage  in  Ontario  just 
compensates for the advantages that in-migrants receive from the relatively richer Ontario  
                                                            
5 In fact people have been leaving the poorer provinces like Newfoundland to go to central Canada for decades. 
But  this net outflow, in Courchene's view, is not large enough.  
6 In the same manner, one could also point to the more generous public sector in Alberta relative to Ontario made 
possible by oil revenues.  8 
 
public sector. 
  In the Atlantic provinces, to continue this example, the outflow of people leads to a 
reduced supply of labour and thus an increase in the real wage and in the marginal product of 
labour. This increase in the real wage compensates those who stay for the disadvantages of the 
less generous fiscal treatment that they receive from Atlantic governments. The overall result 
of migration in this case is a situation in which the real wage and marginal productivity of 
labour are higher in the Atlantic region than in Ontario. 
In this example, national output and average earned income in the country as a whole 
could be increased by moving workers out of Ontario and back into the Atlantic region. In such 
a situation, a federal unemployment insurance system that provided more generous benefits to 
residents of Atlantic Canada could help to offset the effects of the greater net fiscal benefits 
provided by Ontario’s government. 
  It is important to keep in mind that regardless of which case appears to be the most 
applicable, the relevance to policy making of both Courchene's original view and the one just 
outlined hinge on the actual strength of the relationship between the public components of 
expected comprehensive incomes and internal migration flows. Many factors besides public 
policy differentials will also be important for prospective migrants, not the least of which are 
the probabilities attached by migrants to various components of comprehensive income, some 
of  which  will  vary  with  their  labour  market  status  and  the  state  of  regional  economies. 
Migration  costs  are  also  important  and,  if  substantial,  such  costs  may  make  even  large 
differentials in the pubic components of expected comprehensive  incomes irrelevant. In the 
end, the matter is an empirical one.  9 
 
In order to resolve the empirical issue of concern in this paper, we need to look at the 
results  of  empirical  studies  dealing  with  the  relationship  between  regional  variation  in  the 
generosity  of  unemployment  insurance  and  internal  migration.  Before  we  turn  to  that 
literature,  it is worth considering what the relationship might look like if the provisions that 
governed access to insurance benefits and benefit periods were in fact uniform across the 
country. Could there still be any connection left between the insurance system and internal 
migration to be uncovered by empirical research?  
  The answer is that even in this special case there may still be a relationship between the 
unemployment insurance system and internal migration through the implicit subsidization of 
job  search  activities.  The  reporting  requirements  of  the  insurance  system  do  not  prevent 
claimants from travelling to look for work in other cities or provinces. This activity is costly and 
time consuming, and by offering financial support, the insurance system may make recipients 
more mobile than if they had received no support while unemployed.  
  The actual effect of insurance on job search will depend on what might be called the 
moral hazard effect of insurance payments on job search, versus the income effect. By the 
moral hazard effect we mean the tendency for an individual insurance recipient to look only in 
their present location while searching for a job, rather than moving somewhere else where job 
prospects  are  better.  (Exiting  the  labour  force  is  not  permitted  under  the  unemployment 
insurance  rules.)    Income  is  also  higher  with insurance  payments,  and  on  this  account  job 
search in other places is more affordable and for this reason may occur to a greater extent.
7 
  The strength of the moral hazard effect relative to the income effect will depend on the  
                                                            
7 See Krueger and Mueller (2010) for a recent study of the relationship between job search and unemployment 
insurance in the United States. 10 
 
value of “location” in individual preferences, just as will the effect on migration of regional 
differences in comprehensive incomes. Some people with a strong preference for a particular 
location may stay put no matter what, while others may be footloose. So this issue is also 
empirical. We should also note that both the job search effects of unemployment insurance on 
location and the effects of differentials in comprehensive income will be observed at the same 
time in the same data. To the best of our knowledge, no one has succeeded in separating out 
these effects from the overall migration response to the unemployment insurance system.  
  There may also be a general equilibrium effect of unemployment insurance that  
involves interregional migration even if the generosity of the system is uniform. Unemployment 
insurance has a vital role to play in maintaining aggregate demand in times of recession. There 
is no particular reason why such an effect will be felt uniformly across regions or provinces. The 
general effects of insurance payments on aggregate demand may precipitate internal migration 
flows by boosting demand in some regions more than in others along with the associated 
employment  prospects.  This  effect  will  also  be  embedded  in  the  observed  response  of 
migration to expected comprehensive income differentials. It is fair to say that distinguishing 
the general equilibrium effects from the other effects we have discussed is difficult and has not 







3.  Regional variation in unemployment insurance benefits in Canada 
  Before moving on to a detailed review of the empirical research on the relationship of  
unemployment insurance and migration, it is helpful to look more carefully at the nature and 
evolution of regional variation in insurance benefits in Canada. When unemployment insurance 
was first introduced in Canada in 1941, only certain types of employment were covered and 
there was no explicit regional variation in the single type of benefit available. Today, virtually all 
Canadian employees may be eligible not only for regular benefits, but also for a variety of 
special benefits, including fishing benefits, sickness benefits, maternity leave, parental benefits 
and compassionate care benefits. 
  Although an unemployment insurance system with no explicit regional differentiation in 
its  legislated  provisions  may  have  regional  effects  due  to  differences  in  regional  economic 
structure - fishing benefits are a case in point - from the perspective of interprovincial migration 
the parameters of the system that explicitly vary across regions likely matter most.
8  In Canada, 
such variation exists only in the category of benefits known as “regular” benefits – that is, in 
benefits associated with a loss of employment. The massive overhaul of the system in 1971 
introduced  a  regional  extended  benefit  that  directly  linked  benefits  received  to  regional 
unemployment rates. Under this provision, regular benefits could be extended by up to 18 
weeks,  depending  on  the  relationship  between  the  regional  and  national  rates  of 
unemployment. Sixteen UI regions were defined by the 1971 Act, some of which corresponded 
to entire provinces. 
                                                            
8 Recently Mendelsohn and Medow (2010) have observed that provincial differences in access to EI during the 
2008 recession were not as highly correlated with provincial unemployment rates as one might expect. They 
attribute this phenomenon to regional differences in the composition of the unemployed. 12 
 
Since  regionally  extended  benefits  were first introduced  in  1971, they  have  been  modified 
several times, as table 2 below indicates. (The following table 3 will be discussed shortly.) The 
requirement that regionally extended benefits be based on a comparison between national and 
regional unemployment rates was eliminated as early as 1977, to be replaced by a calculation 
based solely on the level of the regional unemployment rate. In late 1990, the calculation of 
weeks of benefits was further simplified by replacing the multi-phase benefit system that had 
been in place since 1971 with a single table that related weeks of benefits to qualifying weeks 
of employment and regional unemployment rates. 
Table 2: Changes to the Regionally Extended Benefit Provision 
Date of legislation  Regionally extended benefit provision 
 
 
UI Act of 1971 
 
 
Introduction of regional extended benefit as fifth phase of benefits. Individuals 
eligible to receive regional extended benefits if the regional unemployment rate was 
at least 4% AND the regional unemployment rate was at least 1 percentage point 
higher than the national rate.  Eligibility for these benefits was determined after all 
other benefits had been exhausted, and was continually re-evaluated from week to 
week. The maximum number of weeks or regional extended benefit was 18. 
1977 Amendments 
 
Number of benefit phases reduced to three. Two weeks of regional extended benefit 
for every half percentage point by which the regional unemployment rate exceeds 
4.0%, up to a maximum of 32 weeks. 
1990 Amendments  Single benefit schedule. Table 2 of Schedule relates weeks of benefits to regional 
unemployment rate 
1994 Amendments  Two  weeks  of  regional  extended  benefit  for  every  percentage  point  by  which 
regional unemployment rate exceeds 4%. Weeks of benefits range from 14 to 50 
weeks. 
EI Act of 1996  Schedule I of Act relates weeks of benefits to hours of insurable employment and 
regional unemployment, with weeks of regular benefits ranging from 14 to 45 weeks 
2009 Amendments  Across-the-board increase in benefits of five  weeks between March 1, 2009 and 
September 12, 2010. Weeks or regular benefits range from 19 to 49 weeks. 
September 12, 2010  Return to 1996 schedule of benefits 13 
 
Table 3:  Variable Entrance Requirements, 1977-2010 
 
Regional unemployment rate 
Weeks of insurable employment 
required to qualify for benefits 
 
As of December 4, 1977:
1 
 
6% and under  14 
over 6.0% to 7%  13 
over 7.0% to 8.0%  12 
over 8.0% to 9.0%  11 
over 9.0% 
 
As of February 11, 1990: 





   
As of November 18, 1990:
2   
 6% and under  20 
over 6.0% to 7%  19 
over 7.0% to 8.0%  18 
over 8.0% to 9.0%  17 
over 9.0% to 10%  16 
over 10% to 11%  15 
over 11% to 12%  14 
over 12% to 13%  13 
over 13% to 14%  12 
over 14% to 15%  11 
over 15%  10 
   
July 3, 1994 to December 31, 1996:
3   
 6% and under  20 
over 6.0% to 7%  19 
over 7.0% to 8.0%  18 
over 8.0% to 9.0%  17 
over 9.0% to 10%  16 
over 10% to 11%  15 
over 11% to 12%  14 
over 12% to 13%  13 
over 13%  12 
 
As of January 1, 1997:
3 
 
Hours of insurable employment 
required to qualify for benefits 
 6% and under  700 
over 6.0% to 7%  665 
over 7.0% to 8.0%  630 
over 8.0% to 9.0%  595 
over 9.0% to 10%  560 
over 10% to 11%  525 
over 11% to 12%  490 





1 Source: Dingledine (1981), page 92 
2 Source: Table 1 of Schedule, Unemployment Insurance Act 1971, revised 1990. David S. McFarlane, Gregory S. Pun, 
and Antonio D. Loparco, The Annotated Unemployment Insurance Act 1993. Carswell (Thompson Professional 
Publishing), 1992. 
3 Source: Table 1 of Schedule, Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971, revised 1993-94. Karen L. Rudner, The 1996 
Annotated Unemployment Insurance Act. Toronto: Carswell (Thompson Professional Publishing), 1995. 
4 Source: Section 7 of the Employment Insurance Act of 1996, available at: 
www.servicecanada.gc.ca/eng/ei/legislation/c12_ei_act_part1.shtml  (accessed August 13, 2010). 14 
 
The Employment Insurance Act of 1996 constitutes one of the most important reforms 
of the Canadian unemployment insurance system since 1971, but it did not greatly change the 
nature of regional variation in benefits. Under EI there remains a single table of benefits that 
relates insurable employment, now measured in hours, and regional unemployment rates to 
weeks  of  benefits.  According  to  this  table,  benefits  range  from  14  to  45  weeks.  With  the 
exception  of  the  brief  period  from  March  1,  2009  to  September  12,  2010,  this  table  has 
remained in effect since the passing of the 1996 Act.
9  
  Entrance requirements as well as benefits once qualified also vary across the country. 
The “variable entrance requirement,” or VER, was first introduced in 1977. The VER related 
weeks of insurable employment required to qualify for benefits to the regional unemployment 
rate. As shown in table 3 above, under the initial incarnation of the VER the minimum weeks of 
work required to qualify for benefits could differ across unemployment insurance regions by up 
to four weeks, with fewer qualifying weeks required in high unemployment regions. In 1990 the 
maximum possible discrepancy between regions increased to 10 weeks, only to be reduced to 8 
weeks in 1994. 
A variable entrance requirement remains a feature of the EI system introduced in 1996,  
although the entrance requirements are now expressed in terms of hours rather than weeks of 
work. Consequently, it is difficult to directly compare the generosity of the VER under the old 
and  the  new  systems.  At  most  one  can  say  that  under  the  reformed  system,  it  takes 
considerably longer for many part-time workers in all regions to qualify for benefits. 
                                                            
9 Benefits were increased by five weeks across the board between March 1, 2009 and September 12, 2010 as a 
temporary measure to compensate unemployed workers for the increased difficulty of finding employment during 
and  immediately  after  the  2008-2009  recession.  However,  this  absolute  increase  in  weeks  of  benefits  was 
independent of regional unemployment rates. 15 
 
  In order to provide a more concrete picture of the disincentive to migrate that is created 
by the insurance system, we compute what the minimum qualifying requirement, and weeks of 
benefits for minimal qualifiers, would have been for individuals in each province under the 
simplifying  assumption  that  each  entire  province  constitutes  one  unemployment  insurance 
region.
10  So that we can compare qualifying requirements under UI and EI, we convert the 
hours required under EI to weeks assuming a work week of 37 hours, which is equal to the 
Canadian average value of hours of work per week over the 1987-2009 period.
11  Then we 
compare  graphically  the  results  of  these  calculations  for  a  high  unemployment  province, 
Newfoundland  and  Labrador,  to  those  for  a  province  that  has  generally  enjoyed  low 
unemployment rates, Ontario. 
  As figure 1 shows, until the introduction of the VER in 1977 there was no difference 
between the two provinces in the minimum qualifying requirement for benefits. Post-1977 
there was very  little variation in the minimal qualifying requirement in Newfoundland  
and Labrador, because the unemployment rate remained persistently high in that province.
12   
In  Ontario,  generally  lower  provincial  unemployment  rates  caused  the  minimal  qualifying 
requirement to remain above that in Newfoundland and Labrador except during the recession 
of the early 1980s. After 1984 the gap between the two provinces tended to increase for much  
                                                            
10 See Day and Winer (forthcoming) for a complete explanation of the calculations for the 1966-1996 period. The 
same  methods  were  applied  to  EI  for  the  period  1997-2009.  Currently  there  are  58  different  Employment 
Insurance regions in Canada. 
11  Data on average actual hours worked for total employed, all industries, both sexes were obtained from CANSIM 
Table 280022 (series V261492), retrieved August 13, 2010. During this period average weekly hours for Canada 
ranged from a high of 37.8 in 1989 to a low of 35.3 in 2009.  Average weekly hours also vary across provinces, but 
this variation is not taken into account in our calculations.  
12 Note that the 1990 spike in the Newfoundland line is due to the temporary lapse of the VER in that year. The 
minimum qualifying requirements are not quite the same in the two provinces in that year because the 1990 value 
is actually a weighted average of the values for different months. 16 
 
of the period, with the exception of a brief decline between 2000 and 2003. At its peak in 1998- 
1999, the gap in qualifying weeks between the two provinces amounted to approximately 8 




Figure 2 shows that not only was it easier for the typical Newfoundland worker than for 
the typical Ontario worker to qualify for benefits, a Newfoundlander who met the minimal 
qualifying requirement was also entitled to quite a few more weeks of benefits than his or her 
Ontario counterpart. In the initial years of regional extended benefits, from 1972-1981, the 
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Figure 1.  Minimal Qualifying Requirement for UI/EI
1966-2009
NFLD ONT
1997:First year of 
Employment 
Insurance (EI)
Source: Authors' calculations based on assumption that each province is an UI/EI region.17 
 
Newfoundland. Only during post-recessionary periods, such as 1982-1984 and 1992-1993, did 
the difference in weeks of benefits fall below 10 weeks. In 2009 the difference in weeks of  




Note that neither figure shows any striking change in the gap between Ontario and 
Newfoundland as a result of the move from UI to EI in January of 1997. While this lack of any 
obvious impact may be the result of the assumption of a 37-hour standard work week, using 
province-specific values of average hours worked per week is unlikely to make much difference. 
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Figure 2.  Maximum Weeks of Benefits for a Minimal UI/EI Qualifier 
1966-2009
NFLD ONT
1997:First year of 
Employment 
Insurance (EI)
Source: Authors' calculations based on assumption that each province is anUI/EI region.18 
 
average  hours  worked  per  week  have  tended  to  increase  slightly  in  Newfoundland  and 
decrease slightly in Ontario.
13 
  In  describing  regional  variation  in  the  unemployment  insurance  system,  it  is  also 
important to point out that even a low unemployment province such as Ontario includes some 
high unemployment EI regions where individuals’ minimal qualifying requirements and benefit 
entitlements  are  similar  to  those  displayed  for  Newfoundland  and  Labrador.  Furthermore, 
when it comes to migration decisions, the generosity of the unemployment insurance system is 
only one of many factors that individuals will take into account. Indeed, individuals who are 
already employed and have low expectations of being unemployed in the future may place little 
weight on unemployment insurance when deciding whether or not to move, and where to 
move to. 
Finally,  we  should  recognize  that  due  to  differences  between  regional  economies, 
certain types of benefits - for example fishing benefits, which were first introduced in 1957 - are 
unevenly  distributed  across  the  country  and  tend  to  be  more  heavily  utilized  in  high-
unemployment  provinces.  Fishing  benefits  remain  a  feature  of  the  current  EI  system,  and 
although there is no regional differentiation in EI provisions with respect to fishing benefits, 
they will as a matter of course be unevenly distributed across the country because the fishing 




                                                            
13 See CANSIM Table 2820022. 19 
 
4.  What has empirical research on Canada found? 
  Studies of the effects of unemployment insurance on internal migration in Canada have 
mostly focussed on interprovincial migration, due a lack of data on intra-provincial mobility. In 
all of these studies, some measure of migration appears on the left-hand side of the empirical 
model, while various factors believed to influence migration appear on the right-hand side of 
the model. There, however, the similarities end. Some studies use time-series data to study 
migration trends over long periods of time, while others use large microdata sets that generally 
span just a few years. Some studies estimate simple linear models of migration, while others 
estimate  more  complicated  nonlinear  ones.  And  different  studies  include  differing  sets  of 
explanatory  variables  or  different  measures  of  unemployment  insurance  generosity.  In  this 
section of the paper, we limit ourselves to outlining the important features of the relevant 
studies  and  their  results.  In  the  next  section  we  evaluate  their  sometimes  contradictory 
findings,  and  draw  some  general  conclusions  regarding  the  relationship  between 
unemployment insurance and internal migration in Canada.
14 
  Before looking at the individual studies themselves, a few general comments about data  
and statistical models are in order. First of all, only two of the existing Canadian studies employ  
data for the post-1996 period. In other words, most of the existing empirical evidence pertains  
to the old UI system, not to the current EI system. Nonetheless, as we have suggested above, 
since  the  changes  to  the  system  in  terms  of  the  migration  incentives  it  creates  are  not 
substantial, we think that studies of UI are just as relevant to the current policy debate as  
                                                            
14  There  exist  many  other  studies  of  interprovincial  migration  in  Canada  that  do  not  examine  the  role  of 
unemployment insurance as a determinant of migration. See Grady and Macmillan (2007), Gomez and Gunderson 
(2007), and Day and Winer (forthcoming) for surveys of some aspects of this literature. 20 
 
studies of EI.  
  Secondly, both aggregate time-series data and microdata can provide important insights 
- albeit somewhat different ones - into the effect of unemployment insurance on migration 
flows. Since aggregate time series data generally cover a longer period, they can provide more 
insight into the effects of major changes in the insurance system. Moreover, the representation 
of fiscal structure in these studies is often more sophisticated. Microdata sets, on the other 
hand, allow researchers to control for a wider variety of individual characteristics that may also 
influence migration decisions. 
  Thirdly, while no two migration studies include exactly the same set of explanatory 
variables on the right-hand side of the migration equation, there does exist a certain amount of 
agreement regarding the determinants of migration. For example, incomes and employment 
prospects  in  the  sending  and  receiving  regions,  and  moving  costs  (frequently  proxied  by 
distance),  are  generally  considered  relevant.  Some  studies  also  include  measures  of  public 
goods and services available in different provinces, as well as taxes and transfer payments.
15 
  Fourth, the  choice  of  statistical  model -  linear or  nonlinear  - often depends  on the 
nature of the data available. In linear models, the dependent variable is either a migration rate, 
or an actual gross or net migration flow. Such models can only be estimated using aggregate 
data (time series or census data), because migration rates and flows do not exist for individuals.  
Instead,  researchers  using  microdata  estimate  nonlinear  models  such  as  logit  and  probit 
models,  in  which  the  dependent  variable  equals  one  if  the  individual  moved  and  zero 
otherwise. Conditional logit models are multinomial versions of the logit model that are well-
                                                            
15 For example, see Winer and Gauthier (1982), Day (1992), and Day and Winer (2006). 21 
 
suited to migration modelling because they apply to situations where individuals face more 
than two options, such as a choice between the ten Canadian provinces. These models have a 
special property that allows them to be estimated relatively simply using aggregate time series 
data as well as individual data, and in comparison to simple linear models they ensure that the 
characteristics  of  all  possible  destination  choices  are  taken  into  account.  Table  4,  which 
summarizes the important features of the studies we review, indicates which type of model is 
used by each study.
16 
[Table 4 here] 
  Finally, when it comes to measuring the migration effects of unemployment insurance in   
Canada, all studies face the same major challenges: how to capture the relevant features of the 
system using a small number of explanatory variables, and how to distinguish the effect of 
regional differences in benefit provisions from the effect of differences in unemployment rates. 
Regional differences in unemployment rates lead to differences in benefit payments even in the 
absence  of  the  variable  entrance  requirement  and  regionally  extended  benefits.  In  the 
following discussion, we shall pay particular attention to the methods researchers have used to 
deal with these two issues.     
  Since  the  focus  of  this  paper  is  on  the  impact  of  insurance  benefits  on  internal 
migration, a useful way to classify the studies is in terms of the measure of insurance benefits 
included in the empirical model. In this respect, the twelve existing studies can be divided into 
four groups: (i) those that construct an index of unemployment insurance generosity, (ii) those 
that use a dummy variable to identify individuals who received benefits in the year prior to 
                                                            
16 See chapter three of Day and Winer (forthcoming) for further information on the properties of these models. 22 
 
moving,  (iii)  those  that  adopt  a  structural  approach  to  incorporating  parameters  of  the 
unemployment  insurance  system,  and  (iv)  those  that  employ  more  than  one  of the  above 
approaches. Each of these groups of studies is examined in turn 
 
4.1  Studies that use indices of unemployment insurance generosity 
  The  earliest  studies  of  the  effect  of  unemployment  insurance  generosity  on 
interprovincial migration used relatively simple indices of generosity in their empirical models, 
whether  linear  or  nonlinear.  For  example,  Courchene  (1970)  uses  the  ratio  of  total 
unemployment insurance benefit payments to total earned income in each province in each 
year. The estimated coefficient of this variable supports his hypothesis that more generous 
unemployment insurance benefits tend to impede out-migration, holding unemployment rates 
in both the origin and destination provinces constant. 
  Boadway and Green (1981), Shaw (1985, 1986), and Winer and Gauthier (1982) follow 
Courchene’s lead by defining measures of unemployment insurance generosity that reflect the 
actual rate at which benefits replace earnings. In these three studies, generosity is measured by 
dividing a measure of  average weekly insurance benefits by average weekly earnings. All three 
studies find some evidence that increased unemployment insurance generosity, as measured in 
this fashion, in the origin province (or census metropolitan area in Shaw’s study) reduces out-
migration, while increased generosity in the destination increases in-migration. However, Winer  
and Gauthier (1982) find that their results are not consistent across all their Courchene-type 
e q u a t i o n s ;  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  f o r  O n t a r i o  a n d  t h e  w e s t e r n  p r o v i n c e s  i n c r e a s e d  u n e m p l o y m e n t  
insurance generosity in the origin appears to  increase out-migration rather than decrease it, 23 
 
while  increased  generosity  elsewhere  reduces  out-migration  instead  of  increasing  it.  For 
Newfoundland,  though,  the  results  are  consistent  with  Courchene’s  hypothesis  that  more 
generous  unemployment  insurance  benefits  in  a  province  will  increase  in-migration  to  and 
reduce out-migration from that province. 
  Both Shaw (1985, 1986) and Winer and Gauthier (1982) also extend Courchene’s simple 
model, by including other measures of unemployment insurance. Shaw adds to his model a 
measure of the probability of receiving unemployment insurance benefits, defined for each 
province as total weeks of benefits paid divided by total weeks of unemployment. In addition, 
in an attempt to discern the effects of the 1971 reforms that introduced regional extended 
benefits, he divides his Census data into two subsamples, one covering the pre-1971 period and 
the other covering the post-1971 period. While his measure of the probability of receiving 
unemployment  insurance  benefits  never  has  a  statistically  significant  coefficient,  his 
unemployment insurance generosity measure for the province of origin has a negative and 
significant coefficient that more than doubled in magnitude after 1971. Similarly, the coefficient 
of unemployment generosity in the destination is positive and significant only after 1971. These 
results  suggest  not  only  that  more  generous  benefits  in the province of  origin  inhibit  out-
migration, holding all else (including unemployment rates and job growth in the origin and 
destination  provinces)  constant,  but  also  that  the  post-1971  increase  in  generosity  of  the 
system magnified this effect. 
  In their conditional logit models of interprovincial migration for the 1951-1978 period, 
Winer  and  Gauthier  (1982)  use  a  different  index  of  unemployment  insurance  generosity 
designed  to  incorporate  three  aspects  of  the  system:  the  variable  entrance  requirement, 24 
 
regional extended benefits, and the degree to which eligibility rules are enforced. For province 
k, the measure is defined as follows: 







,                (1) 
where MAXk is the maximum number of weeks of benefits to which a person with minimum 
qualifying weeks is entitled, MINk is the minimum number of weeks required to qualify for 
benefits, CAk is the number of claims accepted, and CFk is the number of initial claims filed. 
Increases in the generosity of the system would lead to increases in the value of this index.  
  Winer and Gauthier present their results concerning this index in table 4-14 of their 
study,  which  indicates  that  the  coefficients  of  UIDEXi  (origin)  and  UIDEXj  (destination)  are 
statistically significant with the expected signs in only fourteen of 72 equations. However, in the 
eight equations explaining out-migration of low-income individuals from the Atlantic provinces 
their coefficients are always statistically significant with the expected sign. They thus conclude 
that the unemployment insurance system did influence the migration decisions of at least this 
subset of the Canadian population. Their simulation results suggest that the 1971 reforms to 
the unemployment insurance system reduced out-migration of low-income individuals from 
Atlantic Canada, but increased migration between the four Atlantic provinces. 
  The last study that falls into this category is that of Liaw and Ledent (1987). Although 
they  use  a  more  complex  statistical  model  than  the  other  studies,  an  extension  of  the 
conditional  logit  model  known  as  the  nested  logit  model,  their  index  of  unemployment 
insurance  generosity  -  the  ratio  of  unemployment  insurance  benefits  per  person  in  the 
destination to unemployment insurance benefits per person in the origin - is actually simpler 25 
 
than that of Winer and Gauthier. However, they interpret this variable as an indicator of the 
severity of unemployment in the destination relative to the origin, rather than a measure of 
unemployment  insurance  generosity.  In  their  destination  choice  model  they  find  that  this 
variable  has  a  negative  and  significant  coefficient,  implying  that  the  higher  are  average 
unemployment insurance benefits in a province relative to those in the province of origin, the 
less likely it is that individuals will choose to move to that province. However, in their model of 
the  decision  to  move,  which  includes  the  average  benefit  in  the  origin  only,  they  find  no 
evidence that the decision to move is affected by unemployment insurance benefits. 
 
4.2  Studies that use dummy variable indicators of receipt of benefits   
  Dummy variable indicators of receipt of benefits are found only in studies that use 
microdata.  Because  such  data  sets  consist  of  observations  on  individuals,  indices  of 
unemployment insurance generosity that do not vary across individuals cannot be included in a 
model of migration to be estimated using such data if the number of time periods is short. The 
problem is that there is then insufficient time-series variation in the data set with which to 
identify the coefficient of the index variable. Information about the geographic location of the 
individual is often limited as well, so that geographic variation cannot be counted on to identify 
the  coefficient  of  an  unemployment  insurance  generosity  index  either.  However,  in  the 
microdata  sets  researchers  have  used  to  study  migration,  it  is  often  possible  to  identify 
individuals who received income from UI or EI in the previous year. Thus all Canadian microdata 
studies that have examined the impact of these insurance schemes on interprovincial migration 
in Canada include a dummy variable that is equal to one if the individual received benefits in 26 
 
the year prior to migration, and zero otherwise. Because this variable is independent of the 
number of weeks of benefits it cannot tell us anything about the effect of regional extended 
benefits, but it will be affected by the variable entrance requirement since the VER affects the 
probability of receiving benefits. 
  The  first  two  microdata  studies  of  interprovincial  migration  and  unemployment 
insurance in Canada were those of Osberg, Gordon, and Lin (1994) and Lin (1995), both of 
which  use  data  from  the  Labour  Market  Activity  Survey  (LMAS).  The  first  of  these  studies 
examines the 1986-87 period, while the second covers the period 1988-90. For men, both 
studies reach the same conclusion: individuals who received unemployment insurance benefits 
the previous year are no more or less likely to make an interprovincial move than individuals 
who did not receive benefits. However, Lin found that in 1990 (but not 1989) women who had 
received benefits in the previous year were significantly more likely to move than those who  
had not received benefits. 
  Two other studies, by Finnie (2004) and Ostrovsky, Hou, and Picot (2008), use panel 
data from the Longitudinal Administrative Database (LAD) maintained by Statistics Canada. This 
database is compiled from the tax returns filed by a sample of individual Canadians, and thus 
contains detailed information about income over a long period of time, but little information 
about personal characteristics such as level of education. Finnie’s analysis covers the period 
1982-1995, a relatively long period for a study that uses microdata, and he estimates separate 
models for men and women in each of four different age groups. His results indicate that after 
controlling for province of residence before the move, language, size of community, age, family 
status, earnings, provincial unemployment rate, and year, receipt of unemployment insurance 27 
 
benefits in the previous year has a positive and significant effect on the probability of making 
an interprovincial move for all groups examined except young men aged 20-24. The magnitude 
of these effects ranges from an 18% increase in the probability of moving for 45-54 year-old 
women, to an increase of just 6% for women aged 20-34. 
  In  their  study,  Ostrovsky,  Hou,  and  Picot  (2008)  examine  migration  to  Alberta  from 
elsewhere in Canada, and focus on the differences between recent immigrants (those who have 
lived less than 15 years in Canada) and other Canadians over the 1996-2005 period. This study 
is of interest not just because it includes a variable related to unemployment insurance, but 
also  because  it  is  one  of  only  two  that  deal  with  the period  after  the  introduction  of  the 
Employment  Insurance  system.  Their  initial  results  for  immigrants  imply  that  those  who 
received EI benefits in the year prior to moving were significantly less likely to move to Alberta. 
However, when they re-estimate their model for immigrants after supplementing the LAD data 
with information about the immigrant’s region of origin and immigration class from Citizenship 
and Immigration Canada’s immigration records, this result changes. After the addition of the 
new variables to the model, receipt of EI benefits significantly increases the probability that 
immigrants will move to Alberta. This finding is consistent with their results for the rest of the 
Canadian population. 
 
4.3  Studies that adopt a structural approach 
  Two other studies, Day (1992) and Day and Winer (2006, forthcoming), use as their 
starting  point  somewhat  more  rigorous,  theoretically  consistent  approaches  to  modelling 
migration in which labour market uncertainty is modelled using an expected utility framework. 28 
 
Both  studies  assume  that  individuals  contemplating  moves  face  uncertainty  about  labour 
market outcomes in each destination. This uncertainty takes the form of different possible 
states of the world, each of which has a probability attached to it. Individuals are then assumed 
to choose the destination where their expected utility - that is, the probability-weighted sum of 
utilities  in  the  different  states  of  the  world  -  is  maximized.  This  approach  leads  to  the 
construction of  explanatory  variables  that  are complex  nonlinear  functions  of  incomes  and 
leisure  times  in  the  different  states  of  the  world.  Unemployment  insurance  enters  these 
variables as a component of income or leisure time in one or more states of the world rather 
than appearing separately in the estimating equation.
17  Thus, in these models unemployment 
insurance is assumed to play a statistically significant role if the associated composite variable 
does.  
  In the first of these papers, both of which are estimated using time-series data, Day 
defines three states of the world, two of which involve unemployment. The two unemployment 
states differ in terms of whether or not the individual is covered by unemployment insurance. 
The probability of being unemployed in a particular province is measured by the unemployment 
rate, while the probability of being covered is simply the proportion of the population covered 
by UI. The question of whether or not one is covered by UI is relevant in this study because the 
sample period includes nine years prior to 1971, the year coverage was extended to virtually all 
employed Canadians. Unemployment insurance benefits in each province were also measured 
in a simple fashion as the average amount of regular benefits paid. Since the coefficient of the 
relevant composite variable (referred to as “Prices”) has the expected positive sign in almost all 
                                                            
17 All time spent not working, including time spent receiving benefits, is treated as leisure time in these models. 29 
 
equations, Day concludes that higher average UI benefits in a particular province will increase 
in-migration to (and decrease out-migration from) that province. 
  Day and Winer (2006, forthcoming) extend this approach and apply it to migration data 
similar to that used by Winer and Gauthier (1982), constructed from tax files for the period 
1968-1996. First, they define four different states of the world that can be viewed as involving 
different degrees of labour market attachment, and hence different degrees of reliance on the 
unemployment insurance system. This approach allows them to incorporate more features of 
the  UI  system  in  the  explanatory  variables  of  their  model.  For  example,  unemployment 
insurance benefits in state 3 (weakly attached to the labour market) depend directly on MIN, 
the minimal number of weeks required to qualify for benefits, and MINWKS, the maximum 
weeks of benefits an individual with MIN qualifying weeks can receive. Benefits in state 2 of this 
model (working just enough to collect benefits for the remainder of the year) also depend on 
the regional variation in the unemployment insurance system.
18  Since the model assumes that 
individuals  gain  utility  from  leisure  time  -  that  is,  time  spent  not  working  -  as  well  as 
consumption, the parameters of the UI system enter the model through a composite leisure 
time variable as well as a composite income variable, both of which are probability-weighted 
sums. 
  Day and Winer estimate several specifications of their model for three different income 
classes, with most results pertaining to the 1974-1996 period. In most specifications and for 
most  subsamples,  the  composite  income  variable  does  have  the  expected  positive  and 
significant  coefficient,  but  the  estimated  coefficient  of  the  other  composite  variable  is 
                                                            
18 In state 1 (employed all year) and state 4 (not attached to the labour market and receiving social assistance all 
year) individuals do not receive any unemployment insurance benefits. 30 
 
sometimes insignificant or inconsistent with expectations. These inconsistencies are likely due 
to collinearity between the explanatory variables. 
  Due to the complex manner in which the UI parameters enter Day and Winer’s model, it  
is not possible to infer their impact directly from the coefficient estimates. However, marginal 
effect calculations suggest that a decrease in generosity in the form of an increase in MIN in a 
particular province would reduce the net-in-migration of low- and middle-income individuals to 
that  province.
19  This  effect  is  largest  in  the  Atlantic  provinces,  and  largest  for  the  middle-
income group. The marginal effects of changes in MINWKS are much smaller in magnitude and 
less clear-cut, in that the sign of the effect on net migration varies across provinces as well as 
models and income classes. 
  Day  and  Winer  (2006,  forthcoming)  also  simulate  the  effects  on  interprovincial 
migration of eliminating regional variation in the unemployment insurance system. They find 
that eliminating the variable entrance requirement alone would tend to move people out of the 
Atlantic region and Quebec, and into Ontario. Elimination of regional extended benefits alone 
has a similar effect, as does the elimination of all regional variation in the UI system, although 
the magnitude of the effect varies considerably from one model to another. But they also find 
that the overall volume of migration (i.e., the number of people who move) is not greatly 
affected,  which  means  that  even  the  complete  elimination  of  regional  variation  in  the 
unemployment  insurance  system  is  unlikely  to  have  any  important  consequences  for 
unemployment rates. 
                                                            
19 The exact magnitude of the decrease is not clear as it varies considerably between models. For example, for 
Model 1 of Day and Winer (forthcoming), the marginal effect in Newfoundland of an increase in MIN is a decline in 
net in-migration of 96.5 middle-income people; for Model 2, the same marginal effect is only 7.4. 31 
 
 4.4  Studies that use a combination of approaches 
  This final group of studies has just one member: Audas and McDonald (2003). This study 
uses microdata from the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID), which allows Audas and 
McDonald to examine migration between official unemployment insurance regions, not just 
provinces. It is also one of only two studies that include the post-1996 period. Audas and 
McDonald’s sample period of 1993-1999 allows them to examine the effects of the switch from 
UI  to  EI.  Finally, this  study  goes beyond  the dummy  variable  approach  of other  microdata 
studies by including an index of insurance generosity - in this case, the sum of maximum and 
minimum weeks of benefits in the insurance region
20 - and by using instrumental variables 
techniques in an attempt to control for the possibility that mobility decisions and past receipt 
of benefits may depend on the same unobservable factors. Failing to account for this possibility 
can  lead  to  biased  estimates  of  the  coefficient  of  the  receipt  of  benefits  dummy  variable. 
  Another problem addressed by Audas and McDonald, a problem that is encountered in 
other studies such as Day and Winer (2006, forthcoming) as well, is the correlation that exists 
between  parameters  of  the  insurance  system  and  regional  unemployment  rates.  The 
dependence  of  benefits  and  qualifying  requirements  on  regional  unemployment  rates 
guarantees that such a correlation will exist. The existence of this correlation makes it difficult 
to  distinguish  statistically  the  effects  on  migration  of  unemployment  rates  from  those  of 
changes in program parameters.
21  Audas and McDonald use two methods of dealing with this 
                                                            
20 This index differs from that in equation (1)  in that  MIN in equation (1) is minimum qualifying weeks, not 
minimum weeks of benefits. Thus Audas and McDonald’s index reflects only changes in the generosity of benefits 
at either end of the range of benefits, not changes in the ease of qualifying for benefits. 
21 In principal, one can control for the effects of other variables such as unemployment rates by including them as 
explanatory variables in one’s model. However, strong correlations between explanatory variables can result in 32 
 
problem: the first is to use employment rates and employment growth rates as explanatory 
variables instead of regional unemployment rates, while the second is to test for changes in the 
coefficients  of  unemployment  insurance  parameters  after  1996.  The  first  method  will  be 
effective if employment rates and employment growth rates are less highly correlated with 
unemployment benefits than are unemployment rates, while the second method focuses on 
the effect of a major change in the system. 
  Like other researchers, Audas and McDonald estimate different versions of their model 
for different subsets of their sample. They divide their sample according to the degree of labour 
market attachment of the individual, on the grounds that those who are strongly attached to 
the labour market may also face higher fixed costs of moving. Four levels of labour market 
attachment are defined, based on the number of weeks worked during the year.
22 
  The results obtained by Audas and McDonald show that the degree of labour market 
attachment is indeed important when it comes to measuring the effects of unemployment 
insurance on migration between insurance regions. When the entire sample is pooled, neither 
receipt of benefits in the previous year nor their insurance generosity index appear to have a 
significant effect on mobility. However, when the sample is disaggregated, some evidence of 
insurance-related effects appear among those who are not strongly attached to the labour 
force - that is, among those who worked less than 50 weeks per year.
23  For those whose  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
large estimated standard errors for the coefficients of the correlated variables, leading to the conclusion that the 
estimated coefficients are not statistically significant.  
22 Note that in Day and Winer (2006, forthcoming), the degree of labour market attachment is assumed to be 
unknown when the individual makes a migration decision. Audas and McDonald, on the other hand, rely on the 
information available to them about the ex post degree of labour market attachment.  
23  Audas  and  McDonald  define  “strongly  attached”  differently  than  do  Day  and  Winer  (2006,  forthcoming). 
“Moderate” attachment to the labour market in Audas and McDonald corresponds to state 2 (strongly attached) in 33 
 
attachment to the labour market is deemed to be moderate, receipt of UI or EI benefits in the  
previous year seems to reduce mobility among both UI/EI regions and provinces, although the 
effect decreases in magnitude and/or significance when instrumental variables estimation is 
used. In addition, those with low or no labour market attachment appear to have changed their 
behaviour after the 1996 reforms, with the probability of moving increasing given the regional 
unemployment rate after the introduction of EI. Audas and McDonald suggest that this finding 
may reflect an increase in the difficulty of qualifying for benefits under the new system.  
 
5.  Our evaluation: What is the “bottom line?” 
  If all the studies reviewed in the previous section had obtained similar results, it would 
be easy to draw a conclusion about the effect of unemployment insurance on interregional 
migration. However, they do not. Consequently, we need to look more critically at the various 
approaches  to  arrive  at  a  judgement  about  the  nature,  strength  and consequences  of  the 
evidence  concerning  the  relationship  between  unemployment  insurance  and  interregional 
migration.  
  First of all, consider the studies that use an index of some sort to represent the relevant  
characteristics of the unemployment insurance system. An obvious problem with this approach  
is that a single index may not adequately capture all the relevant aspects of the system. In 
particular,  both  the  ease  of  qualifying  for  benefits  and  the  generosity  of  benefits  once  an 
individual has qualified need to be taken into account. The simple ratio of benefits to earnings 
used in most of these studies may increase as it becomes easier to qualify for benefits and as 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Day and Winer, while “weak” attachment in Audas and McDonald corresponds to state 3 in Day and Winer. 
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the generosity of benefits increases, but it does not allow these two aspects of the generosity 
of  the  system  to  affect  migration  decisions  independently.  Only  Shaw  (1985,  1986)  allows 
measures of both the generosity of benefits and the probability of receiving them to have 
separate  effects  on  migration  decisions  (although  the  latter  did  not  appear  to  have  a 
statistically significant effect). 
  An additional problem with this approach as it was implemented by the various studies 
is that with only one exception, the index used does not distinguish between regular benefits, 
which since 1971 have been subject to regional variation, and other types of benefits, which are 
not.
24  This is a potential problem since in principle the unemployment insurance indices used 
could rise due to an increase in payments of, say, parental benefits or fishing benefits, in the 
absence  of  any  changes  in  the  degree  of  regional  variation  in  regular  benefits.  Thus  the 
inclusion of special benefits that do not vary across regions may to some extent contaminate 
the results, making it harder to determine the effects of the regional variation built into the 
system. Only the work of Courchene (1970), whose sample period pre-dates the introduction of 
explicit  regional  variation  in  benefits,  is  exempt  from  this  criticism,  although  Winer  and 
Gauthier (1982), in the second part of their study, employ an index that depends primarily on     
parameters of the system that vary across regions rather than on total benefits actually paid. 
  After 1990, the literature splits into two distinct strands: studies that use microdata, and  
studies that apply a more structural approach to time-series data. Studies that use microdata 
include a dummy variable for receipt of insurance benefits during the year prior to moving. But 
while these studies do provide many new insights into the determinants of migration, when it 
                                                            
24 These studies seem to use total unemployment insurance benefits rather than just regular benefits as the 
measure of benefits paid in the numerator of the index. 35 
 
comes to investigating the effects of regional variation in the unemployment insurance system 
on internal migration they have some limitations.  
  First of all, all but one of these studies restrict their attention to the move-stay decision, 
ignoring the choice of destination. Even the one study that does consider destination choice - 
Ostrovsky, Hou and Picot (2008) - limits the destination choices to Alberta and any province 
other than Alberta. Consequently, unlike the time-series studies these studies do not include 
both origin and destination characteristics as explanatory variables.  In the presence of regional 
differences in unemployment insurance benefits, however, one might expect the identity of the 
province of origin to affect the nature of the relationship between receipt of benefits and the 
migration decision. When all origins are pooled, as is the case in these studies, it is impossible 
to capture such differences - only the average effect will be measured. Needless to say, this 
average effect may vary with the data set. 
  Second, a dummy variable indicator of receipt of benefits shares some of the same 
limitations as the benefit indices used in earlier studies. It does not reflect regional differences 
in weeks of benefits, because it will equal one for all benefit recipients regardless of the length 
of  the  period  for  which  they  received  benefits.  Only  regional  differences  in  the  ease  of 
qualifying for benefits will be captured by the dummy variable, since such differences should 
lead to more individuals with a value of one in high unemployment regions. Furthermore, these 
dummy variables do not appear to distinguish between receipt of regular benefits and other 
types of benefits that are not subject to regional differences in generosity.
25 
                                                            
25 The variable definitions provided in the studies simply state that the dummy variable equals one if the individual 
received unemployment insurance benefits. The data files probably do not distinguish between regular and special 
benefits.  36 
 
  Finally,  if  some  of  the  explanatory  variables  included  in  a  model  estimated  using 
microdata  are  correlated  with  unobservable  factors  that  also  influence  migration,  the 
parameter estimates will be biased and cannot be interpreted as reflecting causal relationships 
between the explanatory variables. As Audas and McDonald (2003) point out, it is possible that 
such  a  correlation  exists  between  the  receipt  of  unemployment  insurance  benefits  and 
unobservable factors that also influence migration decisions. Theirs is the only microdata study 
thus far that attempts to correct for this problem using an instrumental variables estimator, but 
it  is  not  clear  that  their  instrumental  variables  (industry  dummy  variables)  are  adequate.
26  
  Indeed, the existence of such a correlation may partially explain the conflicting results 
emerging from microdata studies to date. It is notable that studies based on data sets such as 
the LMAS or the SLID that provide more information about personal characteristics such as 
education, industry, and occupation generate different results from those based on the LAD, 
which does not contain such information. In particular, the former studies (Osberg, Gordon, 
and  Lin  1994;  Lin  1995;  Audas  and  McDonald  2003)  find  little  or  no  impact  of  receipt  of 
unemployment  insurance  benefits  on  migration  (even  without  using  instrumental  variables 
estimators), while the latter (Finnie 2004; Ostrovsky, Hou, and Picot 2008) find that receipt of 
benefits  has  a  positive  impact  on  migration.  This  comparison  suggests  that  the  positive 
correlation observed in the LAD-based studies may simply be an artefact of the inability of the 
researchers to control for all important determinants of migration. If so, the microdata studies 
based on the LMAS and the SLID may provide a more accurate picture of the migration effects  
                                                            
26 The quality of instrumental variables estimates depends heavily on the quality of the instrumental variables 
used. Audas and McDonald do not provide any information about the strength of their instruments, probably 
because tests for weak instruments were not widely used at the time they carried out their research. 37 
 
of receipt of unemployment benefits than to the LAD-based studies. 
  Of course, endogeneity problems that lead to correlations between the explanatory 
variables and the error terms of a migration model may also exist in studies that use time-series 
data. In fact, economic theory suggests that wages, unemployment rates and migration flows 
are all jointly determined.  Flows of migrants between labour markets in response to wage and 
unemployment  rate  differentials  should  in  principle  lead  to  changes  in  those  wage  and 
unemployment rate differentials, leading to further changes in migration flows. But because 
annual rates of net in-migration to the Canadian provinces tend to be small, this endogeneity 
problem may be less serious than that facing microdata studies.
27  Furthermore, Day and Winer 
(2006, forthcoming) find that under favourable assumptions about the effect of migration on 
unemployment rates, even the complete elimination of regional variation in unemployment 
insurance  would  have  a  very  small  effect  on  those  unemployment  rates  as  a  result  of 
interprovincial migration.  
  Because  it  allows  the  researcher  to  include  more  policy  parameters  than  other 
approaches,  the  structural  approach  adopted  by  Day  (1992)  and  Day  and  Winer  has  the 
potential to provide more precise information about the migration effects of the design of 
unemployment insurance systems than do the other approaches. Day and Winer also focus 
directly on regular benefits, the category of benefits that does involve regional variation in both 
qualifying  requirements  and  generosity  of  benefits.    These  models  are  also  more  firmly 
grounded  in  microeconomic  theory,  in  that  the  estimating  equation  is  linked  to  a  specific 
                                                            
27 Annual rates of net in-migration to the ten provinces ranged in absolute value from 0.01% to 2.04% during the 
1971-2009 period. During the same period, rates of in-migration ranged from 0.26% to 4.99%, and rates of out-
migration ranged from 0.33% to 4.21%. (Migration rates were calculated using data from CANSIM Tables 510001 
and 510018, retrieved on October 26, 2010.) 38 
 
functional form for individual utility functions. However, in practice these models suffer from a 
collinearity problem that makes it difficult to precisely estimate the effects of unemployment 
insurance parameters. This problem can be traced in part to the dependence of the insurance 
parameters  on  regional  unemployment  rates,  which,  as  has  already  been  noted,  makes  it 
difficult to empirically distinguish the effects of higher unemployment rates from the effects of 
a more generous unemployment system given the unemployment rate. All time-series studies 
likely  suffer  to  some  extent  from  this  problem,  although  most  don’t  report  correlations 
between  explanatory  variables,  making  it  impossible  to  determine  the  severity  of  the 
problem.
28  Day and Winer address this problem by carrying out simulations using more than 
one version of their model, rather than relying on just one set of estimates. This gives them two 
alternative estimates of the effect of any policy change, one of which is considerably larger than 
the other. 
  Thus no one approach or study can be said to clearly dominate all others, since all have 
their strengths and weaknesses. As one would expect, more recent studies have made use of 
advances  in  data,  econometric  methods  and  software  that  were  not  available  to  earlier 
researchers, but these advances have not succeeded in eliminating all the problems inherent in  
evaluating the effect of unemployment insurance on migration flows.  
So what is the “bottom line” of this review? First of all, we know that theoretically, an  
unemployment insurance system can have two opposing effects on migration. The first is to 
finance job search, which would tend to increase migration, while the second is to influence the 
choice  of  destination  by  encouraging  people  to  choose  destinations  with  more  generous 
                                                            
28 Only Liaw and Ledent (1987), Day (1992), and Day and Winer (2006, forthcoming) report coefficients of 
correlation between at least some of their explanatory variables. 39 
 
benefits. The studies that use time-series data, together with Audas and McDonald (2003), 
suggest that if unemployment benefits have an effect on migration, it is the destination choice 
effect  that  is  the  stronger  of  the  two.  Secondly,  although  the  results  of  Finnie  (2004)  and 
Ostrovsky  et  al.  (2008)  suggest  that  it  is  the  mobility-enhancing  job-search  effect  that  is 
stronger, there is reason to believe that this result simply reflects the dependence of both 
migration decisions and receipt of insurance benefits on the same unobservable factors, rather 
than a causal relationship between unemployment insurance benefits and migration decisions. 
    Thirdly, the work of Winer and Gauthier (1982), Audas and McDonald (2003), and Day 
and Winer (2006, forthcoming) suggests that only a subset of the population is influenced by 
unemployment  insurance  benefits  when  making  migration  decisions.  This  subset  of  the 
population  consists  of  individuals  who  are  more  likely  to  make  use  of  the  unemployment 
insurance system because they are not strongly attached to the labour force in the sense that 
they are not likely to be employed for the full year.  (Winer and Gauthier and Day and Winer 
divide their samples into income classes, but their low income class is likely to contain a high 
proportion of individuals who are not strongly attached to the labour force in the sense of 
Audas and McDonald.)  Although neither Winer and Gauthier nor Day and Winer provide direct 
information on the proportion of tax filers that fall into their low income class, in Audas and 
McDonald’s study moderately attached and weakly attached individuals account for only 12% 
of household heads, while 78% of household heads are strongly attached to the labour market. 
In light of the fact that such a small proportion of the labour force is likely to care much about 
unemployment  benefits,  it  is  not  surprising  that  studies  that  aggregate  across  the  entire 
population or sample do not always observe much of an effect. 40 
 
  Last but not least, the marginal effects and simulation results provided by some studies 
suggest that where a statistically significant effect exists, it is too small to have much of an 
effect on provincial economies. Even when they use the set of estimates that is most likely to 
yield large effects, Day and Winer (2006, forthcoming) find that a simulation in which both the 
variable  entrance  requirement  and  regional  extended  benefits  are  eliminated  would  only 
reduce Newfoundland’s average unemployment rate over the 1978-1996 period to 16.5%, as 
compared to an actual average unemployment rate over that period of approximately 16.8%.
29  
Thus while there does exist empirical evidence that Courchene’s (1970) argument about the 
direction  of  the  effect  of  the  regional  variation  in  unemployment  insurance  generosity  is 
correct, the magnitude of the effect appears to be too small to have serious consequences for 
the interregional allocation of labour services. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
  One  of  the  difficulties  of  studying  the  relationship  between  the  unemployment 
insurance system and internal migration decisions is that regional variation in unemployment 
insurance indicators such as the ratio of average benefits to average earnings arises from two 
different sources.  The first is the explicit dependence of both qualifying requirements and 
benefit  periods  on  regional  unemployment  rates,  while  the  second  is  the  existence  of 
differences between regional economies. Most empirical studies of the migration effects of 
unemployment  insurance  do  not  clearly distinguish between these two  sources  of  regional 
                                                            
29  This  hypothetical  change  in  unemployment  rates  was  calculated  by  assuming  that  all  out-migrants  from 
Newfoundland were unemployed, while all in-migrants were employed. Using their alternative model, the same 
simulation yielded no change in the average annual unemployment rate. 41 
 
variation. A further source of difficulty is that there have not been any controlled experiments 
that can help us evaluate more accurately the migration effects of unemployment insurance in 
Canada. 
  Some studies do better than others in dealing with these and other issues that we have 
raised in the course of our review. If we look across all of the studies that have been produced 
so far, we can say that there is no evidence showing that regional variation in the generosity of 
regular benefits, either before or after 1996, has had an effect on the volume of interprovincial 
migration substantial enough to alter the provincial allocation of labour services. Simulations 
based  on  empirical  estimates  suggest  that  even  the  complete  elimination  of  the  explicit 
regional variation in the system would not be a large enough shock to have an important effect 
on regional labour markets. 
This conclusion must be tempered with the observation that studies based on historical  
data can only evaluate the experiences that are reflected in that data. Since big shocks or 
radical policy changes rarely occur, simulations of the effect of such shocks based on estimates 
derived  from  historical  data  may  produce  inaccurate  results.  Day  and  Winer  (2006, 
forthcoming) provide evidence that extraordinary events such as the closing of the Atlantic cod 
fishery after 1992 have large effects on internal migration flows, and one may ask whether the 
complete elimination of regional variation in the current EI system constitutes such a large 
shock.  If so, the simulation results reported by Day and Winer might underestimate the effects 
of such a policy change.  
On the other hand, Day and Winer find that the simulated effect of eliminating regional 
variation  in  the  insurance  system  is  even  smaller  when  they  repeat  their  simulation  using 42 
 
estimates derived from a data set that covers the 1968-1996 period, a period that includes   
three  years  of  data  prior  to  the  initial  introduction  of  regional  variation  in  unemployment 
insurance in 1971. This suggests that even the elimination of regional variation in the insurance 
system is not so large a shock that we need to be concerned that its effects have been grossly 
underestimated. Thus it appears safe to conclude that policy changes involving the degree of 
regional  variation  in  the  unemployment  insurance  system  are  unlikely  to  have  serious 
consequences for the interprovincial allocation of labour services resulting from policy-induced 
migration.  Furthermore,  the  few  studies that  consider  migration  at  the  sub-provincial  level 
suggest that the effects of regional variation in the generosity of benefits are similar for both 
intra-provincial and interprovincial migration. 
  Perhaps the most important implication of our findings for the making of public policy is 
that if changes in the degree of regional variation in the insurance system are contemplated, 
justification for such changes is not to be found in the removal of incentives for people to 
remain where unemployment generosity is relatively high. These incentives exist, but there is 
no evidence that they have a large impact on interprovincial or interregional migration. There 
may be efficiency reasons for reducing the generosity of the system in higher unemployment 
regions,  for  example  because  this  would  alter  work-leisure  decisions  in  those  regions  in  a 
socially beneficial manner. But the longstanding bias against regional variation in insurance 
generosity  based  on  its  consequences  for  the  regional  allocation  of  labour  have  not  been 
substantiated.  
  Arguments for regional equity in access to, and in benefits from the insurance system of 
course remain valid. Such considerations may include concern with the individual inequities 43 
 
arising from regional differentiation in benefit generosity that were pointed to by the Mowat 
Task Force in its 2010 discussion paper (Mowat 2010), and may also include long-standing 
arguments for greater interregional equity on a provincial basis. Like the effect of EI on labour-
leisure choices in particular locations, these equity issues are not addressed by the literature 
we  have  reviewed.  What  we  can  say  here  is  that  arguments  for  equity  in  the  receipt  of 
unemployment  insurance  cannot  be  bolstered  by  an  appeal  to  the  removal  of  inefficient 
interregional migration as a by-product of the pursuit of greater equity. They must stand on 
their own.  
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Table 4 




Study  Data  Empirical model 
2  UI/EI Measure  Results 
Courchene (1970)  Gross interprovincial 
migration rates of family 
allowance recipients, 
1952-67 
Linear  Ratio of total UI benefits 
to earned income in the 
sending province (two 
equations only) 
Higher UI benefits in origin  
have significant negative 
effect on out-migration 
Boadway and Green 
(1981) 
Net migration to 
Newfoundland, 1951-78  
Linear  Average weekly UI 
benefits per claim divided 
by average weekly 
earnings in Newfoundland 
Increases in UI/EI measure 
significantly increase net 
migration to 
Newfoundland 
Winer and Gauthier (1982)  Gross interprovincial 







migration rates of 
individuals in  10% sample 









Conditional logit  
Ratio of average weekly UI 
payments to average 





Origin and destination 
values of index of UI 
generosity in (1) 
More generous UI 
impedes out-migration 
and encourages in-




Atlantic provinces  
negatively related to 
increases in generosity of 
UI in Atlantic region, 
positively related to 
increases in generosity of 
UI benefits elsewhere 47 
 
Shaw (1985, 1986)  Gross migration rates 
between 17 census 
metropolitan areas, 1961, 
1971, 1976, and 1981 
censuses 
Conditional logit   Average weekly payment 
of UI benefits in province 
divided by  average weekly 
wage in  CMA (generosity 
of UI), ratio of total weeks 
of UI benefits paid to total 
number of weeks of 
unemployment in province 
(probability of receiving 
UI) 
Increased generosity of UI 




In post-1971 sample, 
generosity of UI benefits in 
destination CMA also has 
positive and significant 
effect on out-migration  
Liaw and Ledent (1987)  Gross interprovincial 
migration rates, 1961-83  
Nested logit   Unemployment benefits 
per unemployed person in 
destination relative to 
unemployment benefits 
per employed person in 
origin 
Relative unemployment 
benefits has no significant 
effect on out-migration 
from region; higher 
relative unemployment 
benefits in destination 
province is significant 
deterrent to  in-migration 
Day (1992)  Gross interprovincial 
migration rates, 1962-81 
Conditional logit   UI benefits constitute part 
of income in state of world 
in which individual is 
unemployed and covered 
by UI 
UI benefits have  
significant impact through 
composite “price” 
variable: higher UI benefits 
in province encourage in-
migration 
Osberg, Gordon and Lin 
(1994) 
Longitudinal sample of 
men residing in the 
Atlantic and Prairie 
provinces from the LMAS, 
1986-87 
Bivariate probit   Indicator of receipt of UI 
benefits the year before 
moving 
Receipt of UI does not 
significantly affect 
interregional migration. 
Lin (1995)  Longitudinal data from the 
LMAS, 1988-90 
Conditional logit   Indicator of receipt of UI 
benefits the year before 
moving 
UI benefits have significant 
positive impact on 
mobility only for adult 
women in 1990.  48 
 
 
Audas and McDonald 
(2003) 
Longitudinal sample from 
SLID, 1993–1999 
Probit models of 
interprovincial migration 
and migration between EI 




Indicator of receipt of UI 
benefits the year before 
moving; region-specific UI 
benefit generosity 
(minimum weeks plus 
maximum weeks of UI 
benefit available); 
interaction between  
regional unemployment 
rate and indicator of post-
1996 UI reform.  
Receipt of UI/EI benefits 
inhibits migration of 
people who are 
moderately attached to 
labour market 
 
1996 reforms increase 
mobility of those with low 
or no labour market  
Finnie (2004)  LAD, 1982-95  Panel logit   Indicator of receipt of UI 
benefits the year before 
moving 
Receipt of UI associated 
with increase in out-
migration of prime-aged 
men and women, and to a 
lesser extent younger men 
and women and new 
entrant women.  
Day and Winer (2006, 
forthcoming) 
Migration flows 
disaggregated by age, sex, 
and income class derived 
from income tax records, 
1968-1996 
Conditional logit   UI parameters enter 
“income” and “leisure” 
variables based on four 
states of the world, two of 
which involve receipt of UI 
benefits 
UI significantly reduces 
out-migration through 
composite variables, but 
effects do not seem to be 
large in magnitude. 
Ostrovsky, Hou and Picot 
(2008) 
LAD combined with 
immigration records, 
1996-2005 
Multinomial logit (do not 
move, move to Alberta, 
move to another province) 
Indicator of receipt of UI 
benefits the year before 
moving 
Receipt of UI has 
significant positive impact 
on migration to Alberta of  
immigrants and long-time 
residents of Canada; no 
impact on moves 
elsewhere 
  